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Introduction 
From doctor-patient interaction and service encounters through to job interviews, a pragmatic 
dimension contributes to the meaning of all semiotic practices and is not confined to everyday 
conversation. This chapter considers how the pragmatic dimension of meaning should be 
understood in relation to the language of law in particular. We outline a number of factors which 
complicate the interpretation of legal texts; we describe how interpretation in law has treated 
indirect and implied meaning; and we ask how far further dialogue between linguistic pragmatics 
and law is likely to enrich the thinking and practice of either field. 
 
In approaching these topics, we should first clarify what we mean by “language of law” (for 
comparative exposition see Mattila 2013; for discussion, Durant and Leung 2016). Most 
obviously, this term refers to “technical”, legal language (i.e. the combination of terms of art and 
ordinary words used in legal documents such as constitutions, statutes, wills and contracts). But 
this chapter uses the term also to refer to two other kinds of discourse that are “legal” in a wider 
sense. We discuss utterances whose meaning is disputed in court or in legal proceedings leading 
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to trial (i.e. content adjudication of contested language, for example what an alleged defamatory 
or threatening statement means, or what is implied by an advert against which a complaint has 
been made). And although we do not discuss the topic at length, we also note how pragmatic 
issues arise in the discourse of legal procedure. Such discourse includes arrest notifications, 
police interviews, jury instructions, courtroom advocacy, cross-examination, spoken courtroom 
rituals and judicial opinions made up of a complex mix of spoken and written styles.  
 
The role and significance of pragmatics differs between these three domains. In legal 
‘construction’– the name given to a process of ascertaining meaning for some statement of law to 
a defined legal standard - both the aim and interpretive process to be applied are part of a 
specialised body of techniques (Bennion 2001; Twining and Miers 2010). In content adjudication, 
by contrast (Durant 2010), the aim is to establish the “ordinary signification” of a contested 
utterance typically to the standard of an average, reasonable general user of the language. 
Pragmatic analysis may be persuasive as to the likelihood of a particular interpretation being 
ascribed on a given occasion, if a court allows expert assistance. The linguistic analysis is 
nevertheless not concerned with fundamental issues of law, and does not confer legal authority 
on any particular, preferred meaning. In the third domain, which concerns the wider field of 
discourse used in legal practice, the approach to analysis (e.g. regarding the comprehensibility of 
jury instructions) is similar to socio-pragmatic investigation of professional discourses such as 
medical consultations or business negotiations (Cummings 2005; Cutting 2008; O’Keeffe, 
Clancy and Adolphs 2011). In discussing meaning issues related to these three types of legal 
language, which are all “legal” but have different statuses in the system of law, this chapter 
considers how far concepts and approaches developed in linguistic pragmatics may contribute to 
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understanding problems of meaning uncertainty that arise in law (which is also an 
interdisciplinary, highly specialised field premised on close scrutiny of linguistic meaning).  
Pervasiveness of pragmatic issues in law  
On most definitions (e.g., as compared for example in Levinson 1983; Archer and Grundy 2011), 
pragmatics is concerned with how meaning is recovered from utterances whose form under-
determines their interpretation. The act of interpreting, as a result, requires inference prompted 
by a range of contextual variables: factors which have the effect of extending or altering an 
apparently stated meaning. In some circumstances, a very different, additional proposition may 
be communicated, which may be described as an intended speaker meaning, as opposed to the 
encoded meaning conventionally associated with the language forms used. Understanding the 
relation between what is said and its context is thought to be guided by some kind of general 
principle; different formulations of such principles, including Grice’s Co-operative Principle 
(1975), Leech’s various maxims (1983), Sperber and Wilson’s Principle of Relevance (1995), 
and Levinson’s heuristics (2000) have been put forward in different research traditions.  
 
Theoretically, it is not the contextual variables themselves (such as time, place, participants, 
topic of discourse, mutually accessible background beliefs and other kinds of contextual 
assumption) that constitute the object of linguistic enquiry. Nor is it the resulting meanings, 
which (combined with informant intuitions) supply the field with data rather than findings. What 
is primarily of interest is the explanatory power of the mechanisms thought to govern the relation 
between utterance, context and meaning. This concern with communicative principles 
distinguishes research in pragmatics from more descriptive approaches to investigating 
interpretation in hermeneutics, stylistics, or literary criticism, though the distinction may be 
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blurred by more theoretical work in those fields and by more descriptive socio-pragmatic and 
‘pragmatics and discourse analysis’ studies (Cutting 2008). The explanatory emphasis also 
differs from law, where, although there is a large literature on interpretation, the overall goal is 
both a practical and normative one: adjudication in a given case. While many outstanding judges 
do not place a high value on reading theoretical work on legal interpretation, the idea of a 
pragmaticist not actively engaged with theoretical or explanatory issues is almost unthinkable. 
 
There is a further contrast between linguistics and law here. For linguistics, the theoretical 
boundary between semantics and pragmatics has been highly significant, distinguished on the 
basis of contrasting meaning phenomena each field investigates and approaches followed 
(Turner 1999). By contrast, this linguistically important boundary is of little or no interest in law, 
which typically views implied meaning as part of the “ordinary” or “natural” meaning of words 
(for comprehensive discussion, see Slocum 2015). Frequent judicial statements affirm, for 
example, that the grammatical meaning of a legal statement includes both what is expressed and 
what is implied, sometimes what is said to be ‘necessarily or properly implied’ (Bennion 2001: 
36). The “plain meaning” of a non-technical word or series of words is what it means to an 
average, reasonable person, irrespective of what combination of code and inference brings that 
meaning into being. 
 
Given that pragmatic dimensions of meaning are a continuous rather than occasional aspect of 
discourse, it is hardly surprising that such concerns are pervasive in law, even if not 
acknowledged as such. Concern with implied meaning may be especially pronounced in 
common law systems, where the meaning ascribed to any expression or utterance will be 
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minutely scrutinised by opposing parties, motivated to do so by the adversarial character of 
litigation (Tannen 1999). In such proceedings, bending and stretching meaning as far as possible 
in order to squeeze in or exclude some implication is a legitimate, in fact professionally 
responsible, task of advocacy. 
 
What makes pragmatic aspects of interpretation particularly interesting in relation to law is that 
contextual variability of meaning highlights potential uncertainty in the interpretation of 
authoritative legal documents. Assessments differ among legal scholars as to how much 
uncertainty is introduced in this way, or how often (and in which substantive areas of law), or 
how far difficulties of interpretation undermine the consistency and fairness of legal proceedings. 
In The Language of Statutes, Lawrence Solan argues that, despite potential for uncertainty, ‘law 
works… most of the time’ (Solan 2010:5). For Solan, statutory interpretation mostly succeeds in 
arriving at sensible and fair interpretations which are less disrupted by semantic and pragmatic 
side issues than might be anticipated. His view is based not on complacency but on analysis: 
Solan examines scope for interpretive uncertainty through interdisciplinary study of legal 
measures, linguistic patterns, and psychological processes of understanding – in this way 
drawing extensively on scholarship in linguistic pragmatics.  
 
Main pragmatic phenomena of interest in law 
In this section, we outline several pragmatic areas likely to be of interest in legal interpretation 
(areas which are also taken into account in legal drafting; see Butt 2013). In particular, we 
consider semantic indeterminacy and pragmatic enrichment; implied and indirect meaning; and 
ambiguity of reference. Some other important topics in pragmatics (e.g., pragmatic markers, 
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politeness, presupposition, or meaning production in conversational dialogue) may be of less 
interest in relation to legal texts and documents. For instance, they may be significant in 
assessing linguistic evidence based on kinds of ordinary language use (e.g., threats, social media 
trolling, suicide letters), but less significant as regards the construction of authoritative legal texts. 
 
Expressed in terms? Semantic indeterminacy and pragmatic enrichment  
Perhaps the most frequent question in legal interpretation concerns how “narrow” or “wide” the 
meaning of a word or phrase is: what its scope is, or what the extension is of the concept it 
denotes. In practice, this legal question is usually asked (e.g., in the interpretation of statutes) in 
the form: does X constitute a Y within the meaning of the Act? Or, in relation to privately 
created legal documents, is an X in this contract, will or trust a member of class Y?  
 
Examples which have called for judicial clarification include what amounts, constitutionally, to 
“cruel and unusual punishment’ in the US Eighth Amendment; what a “fair rate” or “safe system 
of work” may be; whether a skateboard, aeroplane or ambulance is a “vehicle”; when “carrying a 
gun” is no longer carrying a gun; what “pay” is, for the purpose of equal pay provisions; what 
sexual “consent” means; what is required to “assign” a tenancy; when something is “reasonable” 
or “objectionable”; and what state of mind or intention is essential when someone does 
something “wilfully” or “recklessly”. All these words or phrases could be described as 
ambiguous in everyday speech, even though the alternative meanings or use they allow may 
result from different semantic properties, including (legal) homonymy (Tiersma, 1999: 111-112), 
polysemy, ambiguity (in the narrower, technical sense of two distinct meanings between which a 
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choice must be made in a given context; for discussion, see Schane 2006), reference, generality, 
or vagueness (Endicott 2000; Cutting 2007). 
 
A substantial body of legal case law gathers around the proper construction of each problematic 
term, reflecting the difficulty that courts face in adjudicating borderline cases (for background, 
exemplification and commentary, see Hutton 2014). Such borderlines matter a great deal because, 
while the semantics of a word or phrase may be indefinite or fuzzy, the legal outcome when an 
adjudicated borderline meaning is applied in a given fact-situation is binary (two values: 
guilty/not guilty; liable /not liable).  
 
Determining meaning in such circumstances clearly involves pragmatic considerations, in that 
any interpretation must be arrived at by contextual inference, filling out an incomplete, encoded 
semantic meaning on the basis of pragmatic features such as co-text, accessible background 
knowledge and relevant purpose. Intention will be central, but an interpretive choice must be 
made between different kinds of intention, including: the subjective, historical intention of an 
author or authors; an attributed, objective (or external) assessment of collective and cumulative 
intent of the legislature; and intention modernised to fit contemporary norms or sense of legal 
purpose, either of the specific legislation or of principles of law more generally. A great deal of 
attention in statutory interpretation has been given to these alternatives, as well in legal theory. 
 
Historically, interpretive questions of interpretation were complicated in common law systems 
by a stated (arguably sometimes overstated) primacy given to “literal” interpretation. In recent 
years, however, that emphasis (which has affinities with a ‘code’ model of communication; 
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Mattelart and Mattelart 1998) has been displaced by other approaches in a development that, in 
acknowledging the importance of context, intention and purpose, parallels the similarly recent 
shift in linguistics from semantics to pragmatics. In modern pragmatics, questions of under-
determined meaning resulting in vagueness and ambiguity are typically understood in terms of 
the concept of pragmatic enrichment. Theories such as Relevance Theory, for example (Sperber 
and Wilson 1995; Clark 2012), suggest that it is impossible to eliminate all the multiple possible 
senses available for any utterance except one, by disambiguation, then assign reference to 
referring expressions and arrive by this means at a unique propositional form that will be the 
utterance’s meaning. Rather, some degree of inferential enrichment of particular expressions 
must routinely take place, widening, narrowing or approximating an under-specified meaning 
until it creates an occasion-specific, ad hoc concept adequate to the particular context and 
conveys a relevant meaning for the purpose of the communication. 
 
This pragmatic view of semantically incomplete but modulated pragmatic meaning is not 
incompatible with a jurisprudential tradition inspired by HLA Hart’s linguistically oriented work 
The Concept of Law (Hart 1994 [1961]). As part of a wider argument about how law works, 
Hart’s explanation of broad terminology in law started from the idea that any large social group 
must formulate general rules rather than particular directions to individuals, and so will 
inevitably be concerned with questions of fit between particular acts or entities and general 
classes to which they belong. Hart was optimistic that in plain or paradigm cases it would be 
clear which instances are subsumed by which category. But he acknowledged – in a manner 
anticipating prototype theory (Rosch 1975) rather than adhering to conceptual models based on 
Aristotelian, essential (necessary and sufficient) conditions and accidents – that there would be 
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peripheral cases right through to “open texture”, or indeterminacy, at category boundaries. The 
resulting scope for context-dependent judgment allows judicial discretion, which may then be 
viewed either negatively, as potentially usurping the authority of the legislature, or positively, as 
a creative force allowing development of the law in response to changed circumstances or 
unforeseen needs - even if interpretation is exposed in this process as not being fully systematic 
or mechanical (the latter, for Hart, an impossibility to which law should not even aspire).  
 
Implied and indirect meaning  
Utterances, it has been suggested, often contain incomplete propositions or are semantically 
under-determined. Readers rely on contextual knowledge and attributions of intention and 
purpose of other participants in arriving at a complete proposition that makes sense (often by 
specifying place, time, scope, relationship between clauses, etc.). The mental work a listener 
does to bridge the gap in meaning in order to achieve coherence relies on inference (though some 
uncertainty persists as regards the precise boundary between inference and other psychological 
processes involved; Kintsch 1998). 
 
Existing linguistic rules of construction (i.e. established guidelines or rules for judges to apply in 
interpreting) include maxims such as expressio unius, a maxim which presumes that expression 
of one thing implies exclusion of another. A maxim of this kind encourages legal draftsmen to 
leave as little room for ambiguity as possible, often by including every possible scenario and 
synonym that can be imagined, in a style that Lord Hoffmann famously described in the case of 
Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 as 
‘torrential’. The resulting proliferation of detail, expressed as long lists of examples in statutes 
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and contracts (e.g., ‘rest, residue and remainder’), nevertheless still cannot prevent implicatures 
from having an important, and not only obfuscating role in legal interpretation. Long lists draw 
disproportionate attention to anything specific that may conceivably have been left out. Given 
the impossibility of any law as formulated predicting all future eventualities, however, general 
principles often need to be inferred from specific examples and applied to other, new examples. 
Other, non-linguistic canons then restrict the scope of such interpretation. One example is the 
rule of contra proferentem, which requires that, if ambiguity in a clause or document cannot be 
resolved in any other way, the clause or document should be construed against the interests of 
the person who put it forward; another is the rule of leniter, which requires courts to decide a 
meaning in favour of the defendant if that meaning has not been literally expressed in the 
relevant provision (see Solan 2010 for detailed account). 
 
Related discussion arises with respect to other areas of legal language besides legislation. In 
content adjudication, for example, implied meaning must be inferred for contested utterances 
such as alleged defamatory statements and potentially misleading advertising claims often on the 
basis of very precisely pleaded contextual background material. In verbal exchanges in the 
courtroom, too, the question arises whether one commits perjury, or lying under oath, if the 
alleged dishonesty is found in an implied rather than expressed message. Sometimes, for 
example, witnesses provide a statement that is literally true but misleading (e.g., saying yes when 
asked whether you have two siblings, when in fact you have four). Answers of this kind violate 
Grice’s maxim of quantity, inviting deliberation regarding intended speaker meaning rather than 
only the directly expressed meaning. It could be argued, however, that Gricean principles may 
not apply to cross-examination in an adversarial courtroom, though Tiersma (1990) argues 
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against this view, urging that focus should be on what a witness meant by his or her answer 
(what Tiersma calls ‘a communicative approach’ to analysing false statements, 1990: 375) rather 
than on literal truth.  
 
Another way of understanding indirectly communicated meaning is by seeing speech events as 
actions. Speech acts (such as promising, appointing, objecting, accusing) are acts that a speaker 
performs by making an utterance, including in legal settings. The special class of speech acts 
known as explicit performatives, whose form directly expresses the nature of the act being 
performed, are predictably everywhere in law, given law’s concern with creating and modifying 
legal relations. Analyses such as Tiersma (1999) show how the notion of performatives can 
accordingly help in understanding both the form and functioning of operative legal documents; 
and Schane (2006) offers detailed examination of promising in contract law. Speech acts are 
significant in many legal contexts, including confessing, revoking, declaring, testifying and 
sentencing. Indeed, Austin’s (1962) first statement of categories of performatives (much debated  
and radically altered subsequently) consisted of verdictives, exercitives, commissives, 
behabitives, and expositives - all stereotypical actions performed by language in the legal context.  
 
In addition to performatives, indirect and presumed speech acts are also of particular interest to 
law. In a US Supreme Court judgment, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes explained why falsely 
shouting ‘Fire!’ in a crowded theatre creates responsibility for the false warning with its 
damaging consequences, despite the locution causing panic and danger only if interpreted as an 
indirect act. Given such importance associated with speech acts, it is unsurprising that speech act 
analysis has been used to describe what constitutes a felicitous (or successful) act of threatening, 
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whether performed explicitly or indirectly; and what constitutes an admission or bribery event 
(e.g., bribery consists of a problem, proposal, completion and extension; see Shuy 1993: 20-65). 
 
Where speech functions as conduct, it appears to follow that it should be subject to social 
regulation in the same manner as other non-verbal behaviour, subject to whatever exemption or 
privilege is retained for freedom of expression reasons (i.e. to protect communication of 
information, ideas and opinion). Exploring the boundary between these two principles, 
Greenawalt (1989) has argued that some utterances which change the social context in which we 
live are ‘situation-altering utterances’. They are therefore genuine borderline areas for the 
concept of protected speech in relation to two important boundaries: one between assertion and 
situation-altering utterance; the other between exhortation and crime. While both boundaries are 
clearly speech act related, neither exactly matches the established linguistic distinction between 
locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary force. 
 
Ambiguity of reference 
Perhaps the clearest area of reliance by language on context for interpretation is deixis. Deictic 
expressions point to their referents, calling for contextual information to be supplied regarding 
time, place, or speaker identity (Levinson 2004). In the early history of the common law, courts 
were conducted primarily by oral means, in face-to-face meetings or moot settings; mostly 
spoken utterances rather than written documents carried authority and were legally binding 
(Baker 2002; Goodrich 1986). Over time, however, emphasis in creating, enforcing and 
contesting legal obligations gradually shifted to less contextually supported, textual materials, 
requiring changes both of communicative style in drafting and in approaches to interpretation 
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that prioritise close reading. In this process, pronouns and other deictics became increasingly 
problematic, wherever exophoric reference (from text to situation) had become either impossible 
or impermissible. Pronouns also became problematic where co-textual connections are expressed 
(from text to referents within the same text). Disambiguation of pronoun reference is 
nevertheless often dependent on context in a more abstract sense, with resulting contestations of 
meaning despite efforts made in drafting to avoid uncertain antecedents by repeating nouns. 
 
Pragmatic issues related to deictics can occur in relation to evidence as well as statutory 
interpretation. Pronoun reference was the crux, for example, of a bribery case documented by 
Shuy (1993: 44-46). A felicitous (successful or complete) bribe, Shuy argues, consists of a 
problem statement, a proposal and a completion. In Texas, personal contribution to a political 
campaign was permissible, but contribution from an organisation illegal. Pronoun references 
were accordingly crucial in analysing the legality or otherwise of the offer or acceptance of the 
contribution under scrutiny. Finding indisputable evidence, Shuy discovered, was not 
straightforward, given potential ambiguity as to what “we” may refer to, and how “I” may be 
used not only to refer to oneself as an individual but also as an agent of an organisation. 
 
Deictic issues also combine with other interpretive questions. In a famous (or notorious) 1952 
English murder case, referring “it” clashed with fossilised use of the same pronoun in an 
established idiom (Coulthard 1994). Defendants Derek Bentley and Christopher Craig had 
broken into a London warehouse. When police officers arrived at the scene, Bentley was alleged 
to have shouted, ‘Let him have it, Chris’ shortly before Craig shot dead a police constable. The 
referent of the pronoun it meant life or death for Bentley when, at trial, the prosecution submitted 
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that he had been a party to murder, on the English law principle of common criminal purpose, or 
joint enterprise. The pronoun “it” potentially referred to a bullet, as part of the idiom let him have 
it, meaning shoot or kill; alternatively “it” might have referred to the gun Craig was holding, as 
part of a plea to Craig to surrender. Bentley was found guilty and hanged in 1953, but granted a 
posthumous pardon in 1998. 
 
A further source of ambiguity in reference comes from how phrases and clauses may be 
ambiguous in terms of their syntax, or how they may be put together in lists, conveying 
potentially different kinds of linkage between ideas. In an English case highlighted by Butt (2013) 
and discussed in Durant and Leung (2016:26-7), a testator had left property to ‘charitable 
institutions and organisations’; this created an interpretive difficulty – resolved according to 
“ordinary English usage” – whether ‘charitable’ qualifies both ‘institutions’ and ‘organisations’, 
or only ‘institutions’ (potentially leaving open the possibility of gifts to ‘organisations’ 
irrespective of whether they had charitable purposes). Connectives such as and, or, and if, are 
also recognised in pragmatics as sometimes implying asymmetric connections of sequence and 
causality (Levinson 1983; Sweetser 1990); where this occurs at an important point in a contract 
or will, disambiguation can only be achieved by pragmatic means. Drafters recognise that 
conjunction, coordination and subordination are powerful tools in writing compact legal texts, 
though legal maxims have also developed such as eiusdem generis (‘general items in a list 
should be construed as falling within the same class as more specific items in the same list’) and 
noscitur a sociis (‘the meaning of a word or phrase is controlled by the words or phrases 
associated with it’) as restrictive influences on construction in such circumstances.  
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A slightly longer example shows how disambiguation of connectives may be approached in ways 
that differ significantly between natural language processing and legal analysis. A Hong Kong 
case, Lam Chit Man v. Cheung Shun Lin (CACV 1046/2001), was required to clarify whether a 
finding or decision of the Court of First Instance could be admitted as evidence of the law of a 
country or territory outside Hong Kong. The court considered whether a key phrase ‘in the High 
Court or in the Supreme Court of England’ (s59, Evidence Ordinance [Cap. 8]) referred to the 
‘[High Court in England] or [the Supreme Court of England]’, or alternatively to ‘the [High 
Court of Hong Kong] or [the Supreme Court of England]’. The difficulty of interpreting the 
disjunctive connective was compounded because, while s3 of the Interpretation and General 
Clauses Ordinance (Cap. 1) stipulates that ‘High Court’ means the High Court of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), the also authoritative Chinese text of the same law 
states ‘英格蘭高等法院或最高法院’ (literally England’s High Court or Supreme Court). To 
resolve the textual ambiguity, the Court appealed to context, but in a manner guided by authority 
rather than accessibility of contextual information: it compared the Ordinance with the Courts 
Act 1971 of England, which showed that the phrase ‘High Court’ would be redundant if it did 
not refer to the High Court of HKSAR.  
 
Interaction between linguistics and law on meaning  
As is evident in the brief descriptions presented in the previous section, linguistic and legal 
interpretation are quite different disciplines despite their common object of analysis, having only 
loosely overlapping aims, terminology, methods, and standards of evidence. Most obviously, 
linguistic pragmatics is descriptive and explanatory, while law is normative. Rules of 
interpretation within law are also normative, as is reflected in their emphasis on authorities and 
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on “correct” construction. Linguistic rules, by contrast (except in fields such as prescriptive 
grammar) describe actual usage rather than limit it. 
 
As regards implied and inferred meaning, the two fields have nevertheless been interwoven at 
various points in their development. Interaction between the two can be found for example in the 
history of rhetoric (closely connected with logic in the classical Trivium, and showing a major 
forensic dimension as far back as Aristotle’s The Art of Rhetoric 2004). Religious exegesis, as 
well as traditions of hermeneutics, has also been shown by Goodrich and others to have shaped 
legal interpretation (Goodrich 1986). Analysis of meaning in the philosophy of language, 
especially in 20th century work by “ordinary language” philosophers such Austin and Grice, has 
exerted influence both on pragmatics (Chapman 2000) and, initially via H. L. A Hart, on modern 
jurisprudence. The resulting situation is one with two distinct traditions of scholarship on 
meaning, applying different terminologies and approaches in their consideration of areas such as 
criminal communicative acts (e.g., bribery, threats, conspiracy, deception, encouragement of 
suicide, or perjury); what constitutes hate speech; and inchoate crimes where provocative or 
offensive language functions as a prelude to physical action. What utterances mean, including 
indirectly, what speech acts utterances perform, and what effects they give rise to as a 
consequence, are all questions which pose major challenges to any criminal justice system and to 
resolution of civil law disputes, as well as testing the scope of protection to be afforded under 
any prevailing right of freedom of expression (Barendt 2005). 
 
Legal interpretation, however, rather than linguistics, is the authoritative sub-system for dealing 
with meaning in law. Linguistic interpretation has less influence. Engagement between linguistic 
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pragmatics and legal interpretation falls into two broad categories influenced by this unequal 
authority.  
 
The first category consists of ‘forensic linguistic’ applications of linguistic expertise (Coulthard 
and Johnson 2007; Gibbons 2003). Such evidence tends to be less common on pragmatic topics 
than on phonetic, sociolinguistic, or stylistic topics, even in jurisdictions where frequent use is 
made of linguistic expertise. This is partly because determining meaning is a province which the 
courts, assisted by juries, regard as fundamental to the system of law they administer (and in 
which they are therefore sufficiently expert). Linguistic evidence is, in any case, always subject 
to admissibility restrictions that vary significantly between jurisdictions. Examples of expert 
pragmatic evidence can nevertheless be found, if infrequently, in fields including trademark 
disputes, forced confessions, bribery and conspiracy cases, health and safety warning and 
product liability cases, and certain kinds of defamation action (concerned with “innuendo 
meanings”), as well as other types of action. 
 
The second category of pragmatic engagement with legal interpretation involves critical 
commentary, rather than courtroom evidence, on topics including how far approaches which 
model conversational uses of language apply, should apply, or may in some other way be 
relevant to legal principles of interpretation. Such work is also considered to be forensic 
linguistics, or regarded as a sub-field within “language and law” (less usually, within 
jurisprudence). A perspicuous early study along such lines was Geis’ examination, using Gricean 
categories, of the pragmatic dimension of US television advertising claims (Geis 1982); other 
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studies include Tiersma’s (1990) use of Grice in analysing perjury; and Sinclair’s (1985) use of 
speech act theory to examine how legislatures communicate through statutes. 
 
Until recently, however, perhaps more influential has been linguistically-oriented work on 
implied meaning and inferential interpretation developed outside pragmatics itself. A series of 
legal essays by Fish (1990, 1994), emerging from his earlier work in literary stylistics on how 
analysis of intention and rhetorical strategy is needed to supplement narrowly semantic 
descriptions of meaning, influentially addressed interpretive procedures underpinning US 
Supreme Court opinions. In doing so, Fish’s work entered into vigorous controversy across the 
range of complex positions between so-called “textualists” (who typically uphold the primacy of 
the legal text) and “intentionalists” (who typically argue that law is whatever was intended by the 
legislature). Some of Fish’s essays also examine the potentially confusingly named approach to 
judicial reasoning known as ‘legal pragmatism’, which queries how far legal interpretation is 
rule-governed or systematic, and asks how far judicial decision-making may be based on moral 
or ideological considerations more than either the narrowly stated or wider, communicated 
meaning of the law. 
 
Alongside comprehensive reviews of legal interpretation to be found in Barak (2005) and 
Greenawalt (2010), two more specific analyses have been put forward of whether, and how well, 
linguistic theories of communication apply to legal language. Marmor (2008, 2014) has 
suggested that, in crucial respects, the pragmatics of legal language is unique and involves 
considerations absent from ordinary conversational contexts. In particular he argues that, because 
the Gricean framework is based on an underlying principle of cooperation, the normative 
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consideration that rational communicators orientate themselves towards successful 
communication is suspended in the adversarial practice of litigation. Carston (2012), noting 
similarities between interpretive heuristics in legal interpretation and dominant principles of neo-
Gricean pragmatics, examines how far Relevance Theory, as a pragmatic theory based more 
directly than Grice on principles of human cognition, can shed light on the processes involved in 
legal interpretation. Carston’s analysis concludes with doubt as to how far models of natural 
language processing, even cognitively realistic ones such as Relevance Theory, can adequately 
account for legal interpretation, despite apparent similarities between pragmatic maxims and 
specialised canons of legal interpretation, not least because the latter are only one aspect of a 
more complex process of judicial reasoning. Issues arising have been examined in detail by legal 
philosophers working at the interface between law and linguistics (e.g. Marmor and Soames 
2014; Matczak 2015; Slocum 2015 and 2016). 
 
Examples and discussion  
Alongside this rapidly expanding theoretical literature, a substantial body of work also exists, 
both in law and in forensic linguistics, focusing on detailed analysis of particular cases (see for 
example Manchester et al. 2000; Schane 2006; Solan 2010). We have alluded to some cases 
above, by citing their crux words or phrases and by brief summary. At the same time, we have 
stressed that legal reasoning goes far beyond word glossing, bringing together complex linguistic, 
factual, and legal considerations. For this reason, in a short chapter it is impossible to develop 
any significant number of illustrations to a suitable level of detail. In the two case outlines we 
now present in this section, we seek instead simply to identify challenges likely to arise in 
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considering linguistic and legal considerations together, and to suggest that case analysis must 
address both similarities and differences between pragmatic and legal analysis.  
 
Inferred meaning across two legally adopted languages 
Pragmatic interpretation becomes more sophisticated but also more challenging when meaning 
must be given to legal measures across languages in a bilingual or multilingual jurisdiction (e.g., 
the European Union, which now has 24 official languages; Leung forthcoming). In such 
jurisdictions, slightly different interpretations might be inferred from alternative language 
versions of the same law. Where this is at issue, it is not only that semantic, literal, or explicitly 
expressed meaning may become destabilised; the inferential or contextual element of what is 
supposed to be the same legislation may also vary between the two language populations. Given 
that predictability is an essential quality of law, contextual variation in this respect introduces 
unwelcome uncertainty in legal interpretation. 
 
In Kumari v Director of Immigration (HCAL 76/2009), a judicial review case concerned with 
immigration law in Hong Kong, an important interpretive issue turned on the meaning of family 
rights based on Article 37 of The Basic Law, an article which provides for ‘freedom of marriage 
of Hong Kong residents and their right to raise a family freely’. The Director of Immigration had 
declined to issue a dependent visa to the 58 year old mother of a Hong Kong permanent resident 
by birth, whose family originated from Nepal. The point at issue for the court was the scope of 
the phrase ‘the right to raise a family freely’. The English text appears ambiguous as to which 
generation(s) are included by the notion of “family”. Discussion of the issue was complicated by 
the fact that the Hong Kong Bill of Rights (despite not being applicable in this case) provides for 
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the protection of family, and the United Nation Human Rights Committee has interpreted 
“family” as being inclusive of extended, not only immediate family. On the other hand, the 
equivalent phrase in the Chinese version of the Basic Law is ‘自願生育的權利’, which denotes 
a right to procreate and to foster children voluntarily, and does not include taking care of or 
maintaining parents. Importantly, but contextually rather than expressed in terms, Article 37 was 
specifically written to exempt residents of Hong Kong from the one-child policy practised on the 
Chinese Mainland. The court thus decided that Article 37 was irrelevant to the case and 
dismissed the application for review. 
 
In this case it is also worth noting that the Chinese version of the Basic Law prevails in case of 
discrepancies, while Chinese and English legislative texts in Hong Kong enjoy equal status. 
Other bilingual and multilingual jurisdictions also assign different statuses to their languages 
(Leung 2012). Complex relationships of authority between texts, as well as potentially 
conflicting contextual considerations, therefore add to the increasingly frequent and widespread 
challenge of interpreting bilingual and multilingual law.  
 
Content adjudication 
Our second example, a UK defamation action widely discussed in the national press and media, 
Lord McAlpine of West Green v Sally Bercow [2013] EWHC 1342 (QB), shows how even in one 
language legal interpretation takes place at more than one level. In defamation, courts interpret 
the content of allegedly defamatory statements made in non-legal settings, but within a 
framework used to characterise communication that is largely based on legal homonyms (i.e. 
terms which bear both technical and general meanings); such terms have undergone, and 
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continue to undergo, contextual modulation of their meaning in construction in the developing 
case law. 
 
The contested tweet in this case was sent by Sally Bercow (an occasional TV personality and 
wife of the Speaker of the UK House of Commons). It was alleged to impute that a prominent 
former Conservative politician, Lord McAlpine, was the unnamed person at the centre of news 
reports and online rumour regarding allegations of child abuse by ‘a leading conservative’ in a 
care home during the 1970s and 1980s. The implied identification was mistaken, however, and a 
case of mistaken identity. 
 
In a preliminary hearing to determine the meaning of the words complained of, the court sought 
to establish what the seven tweeted words meant: ‘Why is Lord McAlpine trending? *Innocent 
face*’. Contestation of the tweet’s meaning focused on two competing claims. The claimant’s 
contention was that the tweet meant he was a paedophile guilty of abusing boys living in care. 
His lawyers submitted that ‘innocent face’ was insincere and ironic, a nudge to readers to link 
McAlpine’s name to wrongdoing by referring obliquely to a contextually salient story. There was 
no other reason, it was submitted, for McAlpine to be trending on Twitter at the time (and so no 
other relevance for the tweet to have been posted). The defendant’s contention was that the tweet 
simply raised a question, was delivered deadpan rather than ironically, and, if commenting on a 
controversial story, was not taking sides. On this view, the tweet invited no particular inference. 
 
In deciding what the tweet meant, separately from either of the submissions by the parties, the 
judge took into account contextual assumptions including an interest in political stories likely to 
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be prominent among Bercow’s 56,000 followers, and the likely familiarity of readers with the 
contextual assumption that Lord McAlpine had been a senior Tory figure. Against that backdrop 
of assumptions, the judge ruled that many readers would have linked McAlpine’s name to a 
search to identify the alleged paedophile because there is a recognised tendency to use social 
media to identify wrong-doers. The rhetorical question form of the tweet, in context, did not 
prevent an ironic or insincere effect as its communicated meaning. In conclusion, the judge ruled 
that a hypothetical reasonable reader would infer that Lord McAlpine was trending because he 
was the unnamed, alleged abuser, and that therefore the tweet conveyed an inevitably defamatory 
accusation of criminality. 
 
This interpretation, which in many respects resembles conversational interpretation, was 
nevertheless arrived at within a framework based on assumptions about communication and 
interpretation that overlap with, but also diverge from, both established pragmatic 
understandings and lay beliefs about communication. Those assumptions include at least the 
following: that for the purpose of defamation a publication has only one “meaning”, even if read 
by up to 56,000 people in an online environment potentially spread across different places and 
social backgrounds; that a tweet’s meaning is particularised as how it was read at the dates and 
times on which it was repeatedly “published” (meaning read on each occasion under the then 
applicable “multiple publication” rule in defamation), rather than viewed as a property of the 
words or inferences encouraged by those words; that nevertheless no evidence should be 
admissible on what any individual reader might claim to have understood the publication to 
mean (hence, no witnesses at the hearing); that, rather, the tweet’s meaning is “objective”, in the 
sense of matching intuitions of a “reasonable” reader of the relevant genre of tweet, neither avid 
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for scandal nor so naive as to fail to make warranted inferences; and that “meaning” divides into 
two categories, which permit different kinds and amounts of submissible evidence but which 
have no clear boundary: “natural and ordinary signification of the words” (including inferences 
based on general knowledge), and “innuendo” (including inferences based on specialised 
knowledge – in this case, for example, the audience’s knowledge of Lord McAlpine’s political 
profile and the content of the BBC Newsnight story). 
 
Pragmatics in law 
The two case studies in the preceding section foreground differences as well as similarities 
between reasoning that takes place in legal interpretation and in other contexts of natural 
language processing. In its efforts to uphold legal authority and control meaning uncertainty, law 
appears to superimpose on spontaneous processes of discourse comprehension a range of 
additional interpretive measures – collectively, rules of interpretation for statutes and other legal 
texts (as well as other features of common law reasoning) – which seek to achieve a balance 
between explicit and authoritative definition of terms and explicitly-stated inferential 
frameworks for interpretive troubleshooting where uncertainty persists.  
 
In highlighting differences as well as similarities, the case studies also draw attention to how 
quickly any discussion of the linguistic pragmatics of legal interpretation must engage with a 
question of technicality and purpose: how far can pragmatics influence or contribute to law, 
which has its own terminology and procedures for analysing meaning as well as the social 
authority to decide meaning without reference to any academic discipline?  
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Answers to this question seem likely to differ between different spheres of law, hence the 
significance of the distinction made at the beginning of this chapter between three domains that 
may all be considered in some sense “legal language”. Efforts to reform courtroom procedure, 
for example, might be responsive to linguistic analysis, perhaps in order to mitigate unduly 
formal or antiquated procedures, forms of address, unequal gender participation, or other 
markers of power relations. In media content adjudication, the judicial and jury intuitions that 
guide interpretation may in exceptional circumstances be supplemented by expert evidence, 
functioning either to demonstrate specific findings or as a “tour guide”, setting out how 
interpretive issues can be scientifically investigated (Solan 1998). Statutory interpretation might 
be enhanced by opportunities to engage the public in debate (e.g., on how decision-making 
functions in the higher courts), as has sometimes happened in relation to particular controversial 
cases and, in the USA, throughout the textualist/intentionalist debate. Potentially, there appear to 
be many rather than one singular role for increased dialogue between linguistic pragmatics and 
law. 
 
Sometimes, however, answers to the question of usefulness are put forward which seem to 
presuppose some more uniform concept of legal discourse. This appears to be so with Marmor’s 
article, cited above, which argues that pragmatic principles are unlikely to assist in understanding 
legal language because law is a specialised language game with different rules that are unlikely 
to be founded on Gricean principle: not ‘a cooperative exchange of information’ but rather ‘a 
form of strategic behaviour’ (Marmor 2008: 423). Such an account is only likely to be 
compelling, however, if we abstract away not only from the many different genres and settings 
of legal language use, but also from various levels and stages of interpretation. Some aspects of 
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interpretation may follow Gricean principles, if only as an essential basis for legal interaction to 
function through discourse at all, while others may introduce legally contrived rules and 
constraints. As Carston points out, referring to Hart (Carston 2012: 17), there are reasons to 
suppose that cooperation and competition/strategy are not necessarily always at odds. 
 
Carston argues, by contrast, that the major challenge thrown up by examining legal interpretation 
from the perspective of pragmatics is more persuasively that the scope of “relevant context” 
within which any legal utterance or text is to be interpreted remains unclear. What does seem 
clear across common law systems, however, is that the scope of relevant context available in 
interpretation has gradually been extended. Through a series of individually small judicial steps, 
relevant context in interpreting statutes (with parallels in relation to other kinds of legal 
document) has grown from little or none in historic “literal” interpretation, through use of 
internal aids such as immediate co-text, the overall text and long title of an Act, via external aids 
to do with background including selected legislative history, preparatory documents, and 
subsequent interpretational development, into more abstract contexts of the purpose of the 
legislation and fundamental principles of law. 
 
 
Suggestions for further reading 
 
Carston, R. (2012) ‘Legal texts and canons of construction: A view from current pragmatic 
theory’, in M. Freeman (ed.) Law and Language: Current Legal Issues. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 8-33. 
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This important chapter examines how far legal use of language shares pragmatic characteristics 
with  conversational uses. It identifies a degree of convergence between interpretive heuristics in 
modern pragmatics and in long-established, informal judicial maxims. 
 
Fish, S. (1990) Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in 
Literary and Legal Studies. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
As he had done in literary studies, in the essays in this book Stanley Fish highlights an important 
inferential and rhetorical dimension in interpretation that he argues runs through legal 
interpretation – indeed, through all interpretation. 
 
Hutton, C. (2014) Word Meaning and Legal Interpretation: an Introductory Guide. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave. 
 
In this clear and informative study, Hutton brings together key concepts in linguistics, 
philosophy and law which explain how ordinary words, commonsense categories and problems 
of classification are approached in legal cases. 
 
Marmor, A. (2014) The Language of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
This book builds on Marmor’s influential earlier analyses of pragmatics and speech-act theory in 
suggesting that the strategic nature of communication in the legal domain requires new ways of 
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understanding key distinctions, including those made in law between what is said and what is 
implicated, and between vagueness, ambiguity, and polysemy. 
 
Marmor, A. and Soames, S. (eds.) (2011) Philosophical Foundations of Language in the Law. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
This collection of essays offers a state-of-the-art collection of thinking on the relation between 
philosophical understanding of language and topics in legal interpretation. It includes concise 
accounts of their relevant research by authors including Timothy Endicott, Jeremy Waldron, and 
Mark Greenberg. 
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